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Many of the games played at the Hindu extremist summer camp 
were fairly violent, as they were designed to discipline ostensibly 
“soft” Hindu American kids.i Even the yoga exercises had been 
accelerated into militant drilling — the transitions marked with 
terse counting in staccato Hindi. However, as we stood in the 
dewy grass one particular June morning in 2002, the teenaged 
campers and I all looked at each other with alarm, as the new 
game being described to us involved throwing lathis (poles) at 
running members of the opposite team.ii As discipline was a key 
aspect of the camp culture, we all did as we were told. I played 
the game as I had with all the others, but as the volunteer anchor 
of the relay race, a pole was thrown javelin style straight into my 
back during the first round. Much to the dismay of the Hindutva 
karsevak (Hindu nationalist “volunteer”) in charge, the teenagers 
stage a quiet revolt; they stopped throwing the lathis altogether, 
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and henceforth let the race winners be determined without 
further injuries. 
 As the substantial swelling on my lower back went down over 
the next 36 hours, I discerned to my chagrin that at the very base 
of my spine where the lathi had hit, there was a brilliant purple 
crescent-shaped bruise. I panicked.  At a camp where a cadre of 
the Hindu army against the Islamic threat was ostensibly being 
trained, it simply would not do to get caught physically 
manifesting a classic (if somewhat contested) Islamic symbol! I 
told a doctor at the camp that I was just fine – “no need to look 
at it”! I put bandages over the bruise, and I became fastidious 
about dressing in private (although I was staying in a shared girls 
cabin) until the crescent moon evaporated with time.  
 I tell this story to elucidate the fact that I greatly feared 
discovery of what remained hidden; that is, not that I was a 
Muslim in hiding or anything so dramatic, but rather that I was 
strongly against the explicitly hateful ideology expounded by my 
informants at the camp. My informants all knew that I was an 
anthropologist researching their temples and camps. They had 
given their consent to let me be a participant observer, but they 
knew nothing of my personal antagonism towards the core 
political beliefs of Hindutva, and that fact remains as painful that 
swollen lower-back of 2002, and as tender as the hidden bruise 
that followed. This ache, however, has not faded as neatly over 
time.  
 This paper explores the ethics of partial concealment, as well 
as other aspects of research with religious nationalists (or 
whomever we may we at ethical loggerheads with at any given 
time), such as representation, rapport and collusion. While the 
American Anthropological Association is currently wrestling with 
the ethics of explicitly covert research, this paper instead 
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foregrounds the covert inherent in our overt research. The Code 
of Ethics of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) 
will serve as a baseline to examine the extent to which the 
institutionalized normative ethical standards for research fail to 
account for the complexities of our encounters with informants 
with whom we heartily and emphatically disagree. In this paper, 
my subject of study is more about the ethical guidelines 
themselves and my personal desire for ethical practice, than the 
ethics of my fundamentalist informants themselves, because 
insofar as I have failed the Code of Ethics of the AAA, it has also 
failed me. 
 
Ethical Research(?) 
 
From 2001–2002, after having received the requisite permissions 
and consent from my informants to proceed, I conducted full-
time research with six Sikh and Hindu religious communities in 
the Washington D.C. area.iii Both Sikh and Hindu communities 
ran the political gamut, some generally liberal, while others 
tended towards conservative; conservativism, in this context, 
refers explicitly to militant stances adopted by diaspora Indians in 
terms of homeland political identities, while liberal tended to 
indicate inclusive discourse with regard to homeland politics.iv My 
ethical dilemma manifested itself quickly, as I was immediately 
uncomfortable by the fierce antagonism evinced by the extremists 
within the Hindu and Sikh communities for their respective 
Others. Yet I did not dare to voice my own enmity to their 
animosity lest I be shut out of my field-site altogether. Since I 
generally kept my opposition to fundamentalist ideology to 
myself while in the field, I felt emotionally stressed and ethically 
unsure by virtue of this opacity, and concerned about how I 
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would eventually represent my informants in my ethnographic 
writing. While writing up as a graduate student, I turned to 
several anthropology professors and mentors from my own 
department and others, almost all of whom pointed me towards 
the professional code of conduct, the Code of Ethics that had 
been adopted in 1998.  
 The profession of anthropology has a long history of dealing 
with ethics, but I will argue that such engagement is sometimes 
superficial, and that as anthropologists we would be misguided to 
place too much faith in the Code of Ethics as they stand. Ethical 
engagement can be traced at least back to Franz Boas, as he 
raised ethical questions in 1919 about anthropologists involved in 
espionage (and was censured by the AAA as a result) (Gusterson 
and Price 2005). As the culmination of debates about the effects 
of Cold War funding on anthropological research, the Principles 
of Professional Responsibility were adopted by the AAA in 1971. 
It mandated that anthropologists must not engage in clandestine 
or secret research, that is, research in which the results of study 
are not made public, nor should the work “jeopardize” the 
people who were studied (Fleuhr-Lobban 2003:12). In 1984, in 
response to the fact that more and more anthropologists were 
finding work outside the academy, a AAA committee tried to 
revise the PPR into a proposed Code of Ethics, in which the 
mandate to work in the best interests of the people one studied 
was replaced by the guideline that anthropologists should 
consider themselves morally responsible for their actions. 
However, the 1984 Code of Ethics was not adopted, and instead 
the PPR was revised (the new version of the PPR was adopted in 
1990); the new PPR maintained the language that an 
anthropologist is primarily responsible to the people they study, 
but it erased all mention of clandestine research.  
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 In 1998, a new Code of Ethics for the AAA was adopted, 
which emphasizes that anthropologists “have primary ethical 
obligations to the people and animals with whom they work and 
to the materials and people whose lives and cultures the study” 
(AAA COE 1998: III.A). The new Code of Ethics of the AAA 
includes the first handling of the issue of informed consent. 
Anthropologists are now responsible for receiving consent 
through a “dynamic and continuous” (18) process that does not 
necessarily imply written consent, but requires qualitative 
consent. “The spirit of informed consent is one of dialogue and 
negotiation with the person(s) studied using openness and full 
disclosure to discuss the research intent, methods and likely 
outcome(s)” (Fluehr Lobban 2003:19).  
 A decade later, there is movement within the AAA to try to 
edit the Code of Ethics again, as anthropologists face new 
challenges with military and government trainees in the 
classroom, as well as the Human Terrain System (HTS) that has 
recruited anthropologists and other social scientists to work 
alongside the American military in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 
Executive body of the AAA has explicitly written against HTS, 
pointing to violations in the Code of Ethics, as well as other 
potential ethical imbroglios.  
 As of Fall 2008 there are proposals on hand that would re-
insert language into the Code of Ethics that forbids clandestine 
research, as well as strengthen language from asking 
anthropologists to do try to avoid doing harm to informants’ to 
requiring that they “ensure” they do no harm. Also, an attempt to 
strike language from the Code of Ethics of the AAA that allows 
anthropologists to follow alternative Codes of Ethics was 
defeated at on the floor of a Business Meeting at the AAA 
Jessica Marie Falcone 
 248 
Annual Meeting in 2008 (Redden 2008), but this issue, as well as 
others may re-emerge as the Code is revised through 2010. 
 Vincent Crapanzano notes that while anthropological ethics 
committees have been preoccupied with the admittedly very 
important task of policing the tenor and consequences of 
fieldwork in terms of the informants best interests, they have 
failed to secure a lasting commitment to moral practice in terms 
of ourselves and our communities (2004:4). I would like to 
approach the assessment of professional codes of conduct as a 
means to re-engage with our own moral practices.  
 In examining professional codes of conduct, Peter Pels (2000) 
and Anand Giri (2000) have both evoked Foucaultian (1977) 
critiques in which the codes can only be seen as entrenched in 
modern notions of discipline and accountability that hide the real 
nodes of power. Pels describes a professional code of ethics as 
“set of quasi– legal rules, as part of a specific technology of the 
(professional) self” (2000:136).  Pels argues that the professional 
codes of conduct hide true moral and political engagement, even 
while protecting the greatest secret of all— that the rhetoric of 
full disclosure is a publicly perpetrated ruse to assert our 
professionalism and expertise: “maybe anthropologists have 
always been forced to maintain the secret that, in the end, they 
can never be completely trusted by anyone, because there are no 
overarching values to which any of their projected audiences can 
definitively hold them. Contrary to what is usually maintained by 
liberal political theory, the guarding of secrets can be supremely 
moral practice” (164). What place do secrets have in the discipline 
of anthropology? 
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Partial Disclosure 
 
Allow me to put (all? some? more of?) my cards on the table: I 
deplore religious extremism in all its forms. I hate the politics of 
hate. Yet, during my fieldwork I played those cards close to the 
chest. Only now can I reveal what was once hidden, for if I had 
revealed it before, then the field-sites of my fundamentalist 
informants would have been forever concealed from me. I 
concealed in order to prevent concealment. I never lied, but I 
never told the whole truth either (see Crapanzano 1986). And 
now, I reveal in order to best demonstrate the hopelessness of 
full revelation.   
 The Code of Ethics of the AAA clearly emphasizes a 
commitment to full disclosure: “In both proposing and carrying 
out research, anthropological researchers must be open about the 
purpose(s), potential impacts, and sources of support for research 
projects with funders, colleagues, persons studied or providing 
information, and with relevant parties affected by the research” 
(Fleuhr-Lobban 2003:248). This emphasis on transparent practice 
strikes me as well-intentioned, but ultimately ambiguous. What is 
openness? One can never disclose “everything” about one’s self, 
one’s thoughts and one’s opinions to anyone; it would be 
impossible to be fully transparent. So then “full” disclosure is 
necessarily still only ever partial, and “transparency” can never 
aspire past translucence.  
 What must one disclose about a research project at hand 
then? I would argue that the culture of anthropological practice 
does not support transparent behavior. Pels has confirmed that 
anthropologists are faced with “the trickster’s dilemma,” the 
unenviable position of being forced to be strategically 
duplicitious: “owing public allegiance to both research sponsors 
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and research subjects, anthropologists can no longer desire to 
show either of them a ‘true’ face” (2000:137). Anthropologists 
may even be fooling themselves; Vincent Crapanzano has also 
written that ethnographers are necessarily “tricksters,” since they 
weave a presumably “true” narrative without ever telling the 
whole truth, yet they rarely see themselves as such (1986).   
 First, we scholars must spin and rewrite our proposals from 
the outset to speak to the specific desires of varying granting 
institutions in order to receive funding, so our project begins with 
a series of strategic concealments and fore-groundings. We 
anthropologists tend to explain our project in many different 
ways depending on which colleague we are addressing, which 
discipline we are speaking to, which body of literature we are 
drawing upon, which conference we are writing for, etc.  
 Our challenge and responsibility to be open would seem 
greatest with our informants, but it is therein that the injunction 
to transparency seems especially meaningless. It is generally easy 
enough to be honest about our sources of funding, but to have to 
tell all informants of intents, methods and possible outcomes, 
seems a guideline doomed to fail. Even if researchers compiled a 
massive master proposal of every theoretical take, possible 
hypothesis or outcome we could think of, and attempted to give 
it to every informant who crossed our path over the year(s) in the 
field (!), it would still fall short of the mandated transparency, 
since few informants would care to read such a massive 
document (not all are even capable of doing so). Also, such a 
document would be itself misleading, because anthropologists 
rarely really know how a project will actually manifest until we are 
either well underway or finishing up. How then do we practice 
the full disclosure that the Code of Ethics of the AAA mandates? 
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All told, transparency itself is far more opaque than we like to 
believe.    
 I would argue that when a spotlight was thrown onto the 
political narratives of my informants, my own politics were 
eclipsed, that is partially concealed. The bright light of 
ethnographic scrutiny foregrounds the beliefs of the informants, 
and backgrounds the beliefs of the ethnographer. At the same 
time, when the mandate to transparency itself goes opaque, 
gazing at it casts a long shadow over the ethical standards of the 
AAA and other professional organizations.  Ethical standards are 
not obliterated through “gentle deconstruction” (Strathern 1988), 
but a shadow of doubt is suddenly cast over its face, which both 
obscures and complicates it. One of the goals of this article is to 
eclipse the AAA’s code of professional conduct, by casting light 
and throwing translucent shadows, in order to urge the re-
thinking of genuine ethical practice in the discipline.  
 
The Ambiguity of Rapport  
 
One could argue that even if full disclosure is impossible, 
anthropologists should make an effort to disclose as much as 
possible, and therefore avoid the active concealment of 
ideological divergences within research relationships. But to 
suggest that anthropologists only work with communities with 
whom we are ideologically compatible is inconceivably limiting. 
Since many communities will not suffer outright dissent from an 
interloper, unsympathetic anthropologists may not just be barred 
from studying extremist communities they found politically 
alienating, e.g. a militant madrassah in Karachi, a neo-nazi 
Christian study group in Alabama, or an RSS summer camp in 
the Indian diaspora, but such minimal ethical leeway would force 
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certain anthropologists to abort their work if they came across 
cultures inclusive of any number of “controversial” practices 
often objected to: female infanticide, violent initiation rites, abuse 
of the disabled, female circumcision, missionary activity, 
patriarchy, caste hierarchy, class exploitation, etc. Has there ever 
been a dynamic between researcher and field-site that was in 
perfect ideological/political/cultural synchronicity? Do 
researchers have the responsibility to tell their informants what 
they personally think of the latter’s ontologies and practices, right 
to their faces, in the midst of fieldwork?  
 The norm in contemporary anthropological practice has been 
to avoid tactlessly judging one’s informants’ practices and beliefs, 
especially as we are often in the process of attempting to 
understand what at first may seem unintelligible. I am not an 
absolute cultural relativist;v
 I would argue that the dynamic between researcher and 
informant is always distinguished by half revelations, by partial 
concealments, by feints, and by conscious and unconscious 
 I have already expressed my personal 
moral distaste for the ideologies of religious extremism–a feeling 
that was already well-developed when I chose to work with 
extremist informants. However, I would suggest that in a field 
context a researcher should try to temporarily collapse, cordon 
off, and background one’s own values and ways of being, in order 
to best attempt to understand the subjects’ sometimes very 
different values and ways of being. Is hiding one’s political views 
from one’s informants so different from covering one’s head out 
of courtesy for gurdwara tradition, eating food that one dislikes 
out of politeness for the host, refraining from telling an 
informant’s wife that she is the victim of patriarchal gender 
dynamics, or concealing from a conservative elder the fact that 
one might have an active sex life out of wedlock?   
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illusions. Pierre Bourdieu has argued that the agency of subjects 
can be discerned through attention to the complexity of their 
actual strategies practices: the sometimes agonistic “shadow-
boxing” that informants do with each other, varying the tempo of 
their interactions in order to position themselves advantageously 
(1977). Of course, they dance with us too. My informants knew 
that I was watching them, and I knew that they were watching me 
do it.  
 It would be difficult, if truly hard pressed, to delineate the 
difference between observing and spying. To spy something is 
just to see it, and we are proficient observers. Spying for a 
government against another government is just one interpretation 
of the terminology, though I would not want to equate our 
normative spying with the covert research relationships that 
would further entwine anthropology with militarism, nationalism 
and warfare.vi
 Once, at a Hindu summer camp with deep connections to the 
Hindu fundamentalist movement, I was playing a popular 
American game with a little girl, a Hindu American camper, to 
pass the time in between sessions. Just as a parent was walking 
by, I said to the little girl, “I spy...” and the parent stopped short 
and looked at me in horror, so I quickly finished the sentence, 
“with my little eye, something... and its color is... green!” The 
parent walked on, perhaps embarrassed by the look that he had 
shot me, but I remember the event, because I had seen the 
mistrust that lies beneath the surface of many research 
relationships rise visibly to the surface. For a moment, I had 
 My purpose here is to complicate the normative, 
consensual, academic relationships we have with our informants 
by arguing that our gaze can be more piercing and agonistic than 
we sometimes care to admit. Anthropologists are always a little 
bit the spy. 
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seemed to shockingly reveal my “hidden transcript” (Scott 1990), 
and instead I had accidentally revealed someone else’s. I had 
spied something very interesting indeed: the Hegelian discomfort 
of the self being defined in part by the gaze of the other.  
 Initially, I believed that my ethical battle with transparent 
practice was a virtue of the violent nature of my informants’ 
narratives, but I have come to believe that there is fiction and 
instability beneath the surface of most research relationships, not 
just those in which the researcher is hiding abject antagonism to 
the ideology of her informants. Clifford Geertz has written about 
the, “ethically ambiguous situation,” of fieldwork in general, 
arguing that “In a way which is in no sense adventitious, the 
relationship between an anthropologist and an informant rests on 
a set of partial fictions half seen–through… So long as they 
remain only partial fictions (thus partial truths) and but half seen–
through (thus half-obscured), the relationship progresses well 
enough” (1968:151). Anthropologists are sustained by the notion 
that the fieldwork is professionally, politically or scientifically 
valuable, while informants are often sustained by the expectation 
of increased prestige, socioeconomic gain or social gain, but these 
hopes are often unstated, non-contractual and inherently 
unstable.  
 Geertz notes that field relationships are often too delicate to 
be maintained indefinitely:  
 
It either gradually expires in an atmosphere of futility, 
boredom, and generalized disappointment or, much less 
often, collapses suddenly into a mutual sense of having been 
deceived, used, and rejected. When this happens the 
anthropologist sees a loss of rapport: one has been jilted. The 
informant sees a revelation of bad faith: one has been 
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humiliated. And they are shut up once more in their separate, 
internally coherent, uncommunicating worlds. [1968:152] 
 
 My rapport with one community of Hindu militants collapsed 
when some of the leaders sought to get me to substantially 
change a draft of a paper I had written in part about their 
community. One informant had requested that I remove the 
phrases “Hindu fundamentalism,” “Hindu extremism,” and 
“right-wing Hindu,” altogether, as he explained to me that such 
things did not exist, for Hindus are inherently tolerant, flexible 
and peaceful. I respectfully disagreed, by citing numerous 
historical and contemporary examples and discourses to the 
contrary. Then, via email, several of my informants showered me 
with a barrage of articles written by others of their opinion, and 
most of these were about the “Muslim menace” and the need for 
Hindus to protect themselves from the scourge of Islam in their 
“Bharat Ma” (Mother India). Not only did they want me to 
change specific wording, but they wanted to “change” my mind. I 
was inundated with Hindutva propaganda and felt as 
overwhelmed and unmoved by this effort as if a neo-Nazi group 
was working equally hard to compel me to hate just as they did.  
 Before this exchange, I had intended to return to the Hindu 
summer camp for a second stint, but since substantial partial 
fictions had come crashing down, I was compelled by two 
professors to abort my fieldwork immediately. While it is true 
that the partial fictions, once lost could not be re-forged without 
difficulty, and had I returned my informants may have been 
merciless in trying to get me to see things their way, I regret that 
my decision not to continue was guided by certain professors’ 
and mentors’ absolute recourse to the Code of Ethics of the 
AAA: I was told that if I was working at cross-purposes with the 
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people I was researching, then I had no business doing research 
with them in the first place. As I read the Code of Ethics again 
myself, I felt dirty, confused, and frustrated. It was right there in 
black and white—my primary ethical obligation was to my 
informants—I must “do no harm.” Since writing against their 
narratives may harm their interests… I clearly needed to find 
warmer, fuzzier informants.  
 Usually there are not such explosive ends to research 
relationships, and Geertz writes that anthropological fieldwork 
depends utterly on the ability to maintain the partial fictions at 
hand: “It is this fiction, not falsehood—that lies at the heart of 
successful anthropological field research; and, because it is never 
completely convincing for any of the participants, it renders such 
research, considered as a form of conduct, continuously ironic” 
(1968:154). Barbara Harrell-Bond has written that in order to gain 
rapport she had to “deceive” informants by establishing close 
bonds that they thought were more permanent, while she knew 
them to be temporary: “I carried out a piece of deception that I 
am not able to fully justify” (1976:120). The difficulty of wiggling 
out these relationships once the fieldwork ended plagued Harrell-
Bond for years, which only serves to highlight Geertz’s assertion 
that the “moral tension” and “ethical ambiguity” (1968), in the 
relationship between informant and researcher, are normative. 
Geertz would have us believe that there is a sharp line between 
these “fictions,” and actual “falsehoods.” I wonder. 
 James C. Scott’s notion of “hidden transcripts” (1990) is a 
useful concept through which to explore the complex 
relationship between the researcher and researched. Scott’s 
“hidden transcripts” are those narratives that have been banished 
from the public arena through the workings of power. While 
working with religious extremist communities in the Washington 
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D.C. area, I was cognizant of the complexity of the power 
dynamic between me and my informants. In general, both my 
informants and I were educated and middle-class, but the 
workings of American racism are impossible to ignore: Indian 
immigrants covet acceptance by the white majority, for despite 
being a “model minority,” they are still considered less-than-
white (Prashad 2000; Maira 2002). I believe that my university 
credentials and privileged whiteness helped me to gain access to 
my fieldsites, but while I was actually inside the community 
domain of my informants I felt quite powerless. I was at the 
mercy of my informants to aid me, tolerate me, and talk with me. 
I had to tread softly or risk being barred. In this complex maze of 
power dynamics, I believe that Scott’s “hidden transcripts” were 
enacted by both me and my informants. “Hidden transcripts” 
may not point just to domination and resistance, but to the 
narratives which go unsaid in public spaces out of anxiety and 
fear based on shifting nodes of power. 
  And to what extent are these partial fictions or half–truths 
on both sides hurting our ability as anthropologists to represent 
and write? This is well-plied territory as well, but not surprisingly, 
this line of inquiry has not yielded many firm, unyielding answers. 
For example, drawing on his work with Afghanis, David B. 
Edwards gives us a series of vignettes that privilege “experience 
over certainty and ambiguity over certainty,” and jettisons the 
concept of “truth” altogether (1994:359). His representation of 
diverse Afghani experiences based on partial truths is an attempt 
to honor the complexity of their relations with him and with one 
another.  
 The Swedenburg-Shokeid debate, which played out in the 
pages of Cultural Anthropology from the late eighties through the 
early nineties, touched on the nerve of partial fictions (among 
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other issues), and also served as a fine case study for how 
anthropology is dealing with reflexivity and the effects of 
internalizing Foucaultian anxieties about “truth.” Swedenburg 
initially chooses to respect and represent his Palestinian 
informants’ partial truths, (although even as he does so, he 
exposes them as such), since they tell us a great deal about 
memory, forgetting and re–narrating the past towards the present 
political moment (1989). Shokeid attacks Swedenburg for 
forwarding these partial truths, for re-framing the debate to suit 
his own theoretical desires, and for forwarding his own political 
agenda (1992). Swedenburg shoots right back by arguing that he 
was honest and forthright about his politics, agenda, and both the 
partial and fuller truths that he presented in his work, so given 
that he had self-consciously situated himself he had not violated 
any ethical norms (1992). This debate uncovers some of the 
ethical messiness that anthropology is still working through—
their feints, our feints, their politics, our politics, his politics, my 
politics—and how we manage to try to find something honest in 
the midst of the uncertainty.  
 But, again, what about those antagonist informants? What 
happens to representation when we do not agree to try to 
represent our informants as they would want us to? Edwards 
narrates his time with rebel mujahidin in 1984, but he does not 
give his readers an inkling how he felt about their militancy 
(1994). Swedenburg was firmly on his informants’ side politically, 
although sometimes they did not realize it (for a time his car was 
routinely the target of hurled stones), and he was interested in 
representing them in a way that would advance the integrity of 
their political ideology. But what if he had been doing 
ethnographic work with the Israeli army at the time instead—
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how would that have changed his ethical positioning according to 
him, and/or according to the AAA Code of Ethics?  
 Our antagonists and tough nuts are not ubiquitous — 
anthropologists are not of one mind about anything at all. While 
extremists really get my goat, perhaps there is a conservative 
Republican anthropologist out there whose personal politics 
deeply conflict with those of her hippie, environmentalist, 
commune informants—so is she ethically required to represent 
them as they would want to be represented?  To what extent are 
we ethically bound to represent our informants in their own 
terms, or at least in ways that do not harm their interests and 
integrity?  
 
Of Reifications and Representations 
 
In the end, my Hindutva informants felt betrayed, because I 
would not promise to represent them on their own terms, or 
champion their cause. One fiction they had ascribed to me was 
that I could potentially help them to defend their views post–
Gujarat massacre, when the American media were reporting on 
the human rights violations of Hindu extremist karsevaks and 
leaders. One informant told me that I “could be the next Konrad 
Elst,” referring to a Hindutva sympathetic researcher. Several 
times my Hindu fundamentalist informants lent me their books 
by David Frawley, a white American who had converted to both 
Hinduism and extreme Hindutva politics. They vocalized their 
hopes that I would represent them to the American mainstream 
on their terms. I promised only that I would dutifully read the 
sources they had proffered, and I did. In directing me towards 
the “right” representations of them by outsiders, they 
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acknowledged their anxiety that I would represent them in the 
“wrong” way.vii
 Richard Handler has argued that anthropologists have no 
responsibility to faithfully represent informants and their politics 
in their own terms (1985). He has noted that simple acceptance 
of the narratives and ethnic appellations of our informants 
without recourse to the demystification of certain assertions and 
assumptions will invariably land the anthropology of nationalism 
and ethnicity into the unenviable position of reproducing and 
reifying fictions. Handler advocates instead for a deconstructive 
process, which is the simultaneous “destructive analysis of the 
familiar and the exotic,” in which narratives of cultural 
distinctiveness are carefully examined instead of reproduced or 
romanticized. This does not involve the anthropologist narrating 
the “facts” of the situation in ethnography, but rather: “the 
promiscuous juxtaposition of texts from various sources, familiar 
and exotic, suggests that disagreements, dissonance, and 
competing viewpoints must be explored rather than suppressed” 
(18). It is the anthropologist’s challenge then to complicate 
narratives, not necessarily to deny them or forward them.  
  
 When a member of the Sikh nationalist (or Khalistani) 
community forwards a narrative about the history of India, which 
I find patently false, I can address this in my ethnographic writing 
by noting the breadth of contrary opinions. When a member of 
the VHP/HSS (Vishva Hindu Parishad/Hindu Swayamsevak 
Sangh) community tells me that in “fact,” there is no such thing 
as Hindu extremism, but that it is only because Muslims are 
“inherently violent” that they ought to be excluded from the 
glorious “Hindu state” of India, then it is my responsibility in the 
writing of ethnography to contrast the “facts” of my informant 
with a mélange of counter narratives and contrary expositions. In 
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the end, the truth and fictions of ethnography remain somewhat 
blurred, perhaps a symptom of the partial truths and fictions of 
fieldwork. James Clifford asserts that ethnography is incapable of 
real honesty, or full disclosure: “Even the best ethnographic 
texts—serious, true fictions—are systems, or economies, of truth. 
Power and history work through them, in ways their authors 
cannot fully control. Ethnographic truths are thus inherently 
partial—committed and incomplete” (1986:7).   
 The anthropologist is under no obligation to collaborate with 
ones informants if it would reify fictions, but informants are 
under no obligation to approve of what is produced by the 
anthropologist either. But the collapse of rapport is especially 
frightening if your informants believe they are fighting a 
righteous war defending their religious, ethnic and/or national 
integrity. The militancy of some of my informants has meant that 
I have been anxious about placing my work in the public 
domain.viii
 Since the Hindutva movement is vitriolic and often violent, I 
was intimidated when certain informants began a vigorous 
campaign to “change” my mind. The Black List: Enemies of 
Hindu Exposed is a webpage, topped by a graphic of a rope 
dripping with animated blood, and listing the antagonists of 
Hinduism worldwide (The Black List 2008).  Although the list 
includes a handful of famous and infamous Christians and 
Muslims, like the Pope and Pervez Musharraf, it is largely 
populated by journalists and scholars who have written contrary 
to Hindu extremist ideology. The New York Times has even 
made the list, as did the BBC, which earned the brief epithet: 
“Blatantly Anti–Hindu.” The Black List is also listed as the 
“Criminals Hit List,” and the addresses and contact information 
of the alleged perpetrators are public posted so that the “guilty” 
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can be harassed by the righteous Hindus doing their “duty” to 
their “religion and nation.”  Therefore, doing written or rhetorical 
“violence” to the violent is not just ethically perilous. 
 Nowadays, many anthropological subjects are talking back, 
and some are very angry. They are not just reading what is 
written, but some are writing rebuttals and even issuing threats.  
Pels (2000) has compellingly argued that the anthropology of 
modernity can fruitfully engage the study of the angry subject and 
the collapse of rapport as aspects of the new realities to be faced 
in doing research today.  
 
Collusion 
 
In the final analysis, the prickliest aspect of participant 
observation with extremists is the actual “participation” itself.  
Drawing on Geertz, George Marcus explored the problematics of 
“rapport” in the participant observation methodology by 
discussing the “intellectual/cognitive affinity” between researcher 
and subject despite a possible lack of “ethical affinity” (1999). His 
notion of “complicity” underscores the fact that our field 
relationships are inherently ambiguous, dynamic and mutually 
forged, in manner which belies the conventional notions of 
“rapport” and “collaboration.”  
 Sara Shneiderman evoked Marcus’ notion of complicity in her 
discussion of her own varying and shifting negotiations with 
Maoist ideology and informants inside and outside of her field 
village in Nepal (Pettigrew et al. 2004). In order to maintain 
“well-being and access,” Shneiderman was forced to vocalize her 
accommodation to certain aspects the Maoist project, despite her 
unease at its often violent manifestations—a revelation that has 
created a tangle of “competing complicities.”  
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 Douglas Holmes’ research on “illicit discourses” required that 
he interview and work closely with far-right neo-fascist European 
politicians (Holmes 2000). Marcus notes that there is ethical 
shaky ground being traversed in the process, yet Holmes’ work is 
important, despite his necessary concealments and complicities: 
“This calculated and imposed naïveté, necessary for fieldwork to 
be conducted at all, is potentially the source of greatest strength 
and special insight of ethnographic analysis, leading to both the 
‘complex or involved’ sense of complicity as well as exposure to 
complicity’s other sense, ‘of being an accomplice, partnership in 
an evil action’ ” (1999:124). Like Holmes, my rapport with my 
extremist informants must be complicated with reference to its 
resonance with complicity in both senses of the word. 
 Marcus’ notion of “complicity” was not inherently fraught 
with the notion that one is abetting wickedness, but the potential 
for such distasteful circumstances to arise remains implicit (1999). 
Complicit relationships with extremists, while still arguably based 
on set of partial fictions, can have very concrete consequences. 
Since the method of participant observation mandates that the 
anthropologist be there, do it, and live it, then to some extent at 
least, anthropologists working with militants could be put in 
positions in which they would be seen as giving legitimacy to the 
group they are studying, by actively participating or even just by 
being there.  
 Participant observation itself rarely pushed me into the realm 
of moral crisis, but it did happen occasionally. Once I was asked 
by an informant to read a passage from Swami Vivekananda on 
stage during a Hindutva event, ostensibly because my English 
would be most understandable to the assembly of Indian 
immigrants who hailed from various linguistic corners of the sub-
continent. The Gujarat riots of 2002 were underway at the time, 
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and the meeting was intended to both celebrate a Hindu holiday, 
and simultaneously support a Hindutva group, the VHP (Vishwa 
Hindu Parishad) of Gujarat, in their “righteous defense” of 
Hinduism. My skin prickled as I sat before the event and read the 
document, entitled, “A Clarion Call to Hindus”:  
 
Mark me, Then and then alone are you a Hindu when the 
very name sends through you a galvanic shock of strength. 
Then and then alone are you a Hindu when every man who 
bears the name, from any country, speaking any language, 
becomes at once the nearest and dearest to you. Then and 
then alone are you a Hindu when the distress of any one 
bearing that name comes to your heart and makes you feel as 
if your own sons were in distress. Then and then alone are 
you a Hindu who you will be ready to bear everything for 
them, like, the great Guru Govind Singh. After having shed 
his own blood for the defense of the Hindu Dharma, after 
having seen his children killed in the battlefield, the great 
Guru, the wounded lion, retired from the field calmly to die 
in the South but not a word of curse escaped his lips against 
those who had ungratefully forsaken him!  
 
Given the context, the speech was not just Hindutva propaganda 
advocating militancy, but it was treading on factually contested 
ground.ix Although I was worried about the consequences of 
refusing, I could not in good conscience read the speech in 
public. I felt like an undercover police officer being asked to 
commit a crime: what equation determines whether s/he ought to 
commit a smaller crime in order to eventually be in a position to 
prosecute far bigger crimes? Luckily, I was not forced to tip my 
hand, because while refusing to read the speech I successfully 
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reasoned to my informant, “As a non–Hindu, who am I to tell 
Hindus what they should be and what they should do?” By 
concealing my primary reason, and revealing a secondary one, I 
managed to remain in the audience, and avoid the unpardonable 
sin of publicly reciting Hindutva ideology with a great saffron 
VHP flag in the background while Muslims were being 
slaughtered in the thousands on the far side of the world.   
 Despite the fact that I never publicly uttered the ideology of 
Hindutva, my research demanded that I assist its machinery from 
behind the scenes: serving food, setting up chairs, volunteering at 
the camp, etc. Even attending a Hindu extremist event means 
that one is at least a little complicit in what goes on there, for my 
very presence may have been read as support by onlookers. 
Residing in the belly of the beast means that one is part and 
parcel of the problem, and yet perhaps simultaneously in the 
most strategic position to undermine it.   
 
Doing Harm 
 
My work with Hindu and Sikh extremists means that I am in a 
position to publish articles which question their narratives and 
may, if anyone reads them, even damage their public credibility in 
Washington DC and elsewhere, as many people (both insiders 
and otherwise) are blind to the extent of the ignorance. Does the 
ethical dictate of the AAA to “do no harm” extend to 
communities which, arguably, do harm? Even if it somehow did 
not, I take particular issue with the mandate, since our 
ethnographic output has never been politically neutral or 
objective: We are almost always harming someone’s agenda, 
someone’s dignity, someone’s faith.  
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The text of the Code of Ethics of the AAA reads: 
 
Anthropological researchers have primary ethical obligations 
to the people, species, and materials they study and to the 
people with whom they work. These obligations can 
supersede the goal of seeking new knowledge, and can lead to 
decisions not to undertake or to discontinue a research 
project when the primary obligation conflicts with other 
responsibilities, such as those owed to sponsors or clients. 
These ethical obligations include: To avoid harm or wrong, 
understanding that the development of knowledge can lead to 
change which may be positive or negative for the people or 
animals worked with or studied. [1998:2]  
 
If that were not straight-forward enough, it continues, 
“Anthropological researchers must do everything in their power 
to ensure that their research does not harm the safety, dignity, or 
privacy of the people with whom they work, conduct research or 
perform other professional activities” (2). Sounds good, but what 
if an anthropologist knows that their ethnography may harm the 
integrity of their informants by questioning their mores and 
exposing how the group is doing harm to others? Should one 
walk away?   
 Pels has argued that it is a potentially slippery slope to suggest 
that the anthropologist must take the interests of one’s subjects 
as paramount priority: “in the semi–contractual sense of 
guaranteeing obligation towards the people studied, the code 
(1991 PPR) may function to prohibit the publication of research 
findings unpleasant to the latter” (2000:145). In a climate in 
which anthropologists are working more often with subjects who 
have a stake and an opinion in how they are represented, it is 
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imperative to interrogate the possible consequences of putting 
informants’ interests (as if informants’ interests were singular!) 
ahead of the subjective truth of ethnographic conclusions or even 
the dictates of good conscience. Pels narrated a cautionary tale in 
which a group of elite informants used professional codes to try 
to force a Dutch anthropologist not to publish, since exposing 
their exploitative practices in print would potentially “harm their 
interests” (144). 
 My initial goal in undertaking my research was to try to 
understand how religious nationalisms and the politics of hate are 
constructed, maintained and reproduced. My primary goal was 
not to harm my informants interests, but to understand them.  
However when I publish my material on my Hindutva 
informants, I sincerely hope that in the process of exposing their 
hate as such, and by complicating their simple narratives of good 
and evil, I do manage to harm the narratives of Hindutva. I 
would willingly do rhetorical harm to those who do violent harm. 
Rhetorical violence against violent ideology itself is the lesser of 
two evils, as the alternative is silence too deeply complicit to be 
endured. Even if completely ethical research with fundamentalists 
is impossible, the moral cost of eschewing such research 
altogether seems far more unethical. 
 Cynthia Keppley Mahmood engages in a thoughtful and well-
articulated discussion of the complexity of working with violent 
informants in her book, “Fighting for Faith and Nation: 
Dialogues with Sikh Militants,” which addresses an earlier 
iteration of the very same Sikh militancy that so perplexed and 
repelled me years later. Although Mahmood is careful to note 
that she disagreed openly with many of her informants, she does 
write that her work with Sikh militants came after her work with 
Sikh victims of the Indian state, and that she was very compelled 
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by the narratives of the latter.x
 At the beginning of her book, Mahmood tells her readers that 
she expects her informants to generally respect and appreciate her 
work. My empathy with regards to the suppression of the 
community under various past regimes in South Asia (not to 
mention the structural racism in America that had led to so much 
backlash against them post–9/11) was, and remains, considerable; 
yet, I do not believe that my Khalistani informants will so wholly 
approve and respect my ethnographic writing about their 
community. Mahmood took refuge in a level of empathy that I 
was never able to muster, and that fact seemed to free her to tell a 
narrative that was not wholly anathema to either her or them.  
 I wonder if her initial forays into 
the suffering and victimization of the community helped her to 
create a context in which political violence and religious 
nationalism could be understood with more sympathy.  
 So while Mahmood may have been working with militants, 
she was not working with antagonists whom she was afraid of, or 
whose interests she hoped to actively harm. Mahmood talks 
about how she was able to avoid agreeing with her informants on 
many facets of their ideology, yet she was still able to speak on 
behalf of their interests and political goals in other ways. While 
not a “Khalistan supporter” herself, she could speak out vocally, 
on stage with microphone in hand, against the repression and 
torture that some of her informants and their families had 
endured in Punjab during the height of the insurgency.  
 While her excellent discussion of these issues was primarily 
concerned with many of the ethical issues at hand in this article, 
Mahmood did not address any of the AAA’s ethical instruments 
to note whether they helped or hindered her progress, or whether 
she even consulted them. If she were held to the standards of the 
current Code of Ethics of the AAA, then Mahmood would 
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probably find herself comfortably within the guidelines of ethical 
behavior outlined therein. She seemed to take her “primary 
responsibility” to her informants seriously, as she worked to 
advance some of their narratives to the extent that she believes 
that they would largely approve of her work. This has not been 
the case for me, so while empathy may be the key to avoiding 
harm, what if one’s discomfort wins out over one’s empathy?  
While I can be compassionate and understanding about the 
causes and conditions that set the scene for the particular brands 
of hate and Othering peddled by both my Sikh and Hindu 
extremist informants, my empathy was usually subsumed by my 
desire to undermine the false certainties that so often give way to 
ever more violence. 
 Undermining the beast can be accomplished from without, as 
I have discussed, but it can also be attempted from within. I did 
manage to push the boundaries of discussion and debate, so I at 
least mitigated some aspect of ideological reproduction while I 
did research. I was a softly dissenting voice throughout my 
involvement with the VHP/HSS summer camp. Even while I 
was aiding one of the karsevaks in leading a discussion group, I 
tried to mitigate some of the intolerant lessons by reinforcing 
some more pluralistic ones. For example, one afternoon the 
oldest batch of VHP/HSS campers and their counselors tried to 
convince me that Mohandas K. Gandhi had been a traitor to the 
Hindu people. An Indian-American teenage girl explained to me 
that Gandhi should have been killed long before he actually was, 
because his deference to Muslims meant that India was not 
created as an officially Hindu state. In this argument, as in several 
others, I argued at length, but I eventually felt the partial fictions 
wear thin and threaten to snap. Once rapport had been severely 
endangered, I usually deferred by saying that I would read more 
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literature on the subject. I may not have won any arguments, but 
my questions certainly went against the “taken-for-grantedness” 
of the place, and I strategically uttered dissent in corners where it 
would have been otherwise absent. This is in and of itself a 
hopeful space in which collusion may provide its own very thin 
silver-lining. Perhaps some of the kids who danced garba, and ran 
relays races with me at the Hindutva summer camp in 2002 will 
read anthropology articles about the social construction of hate in 
Hindutva discourses and choose to re-think some of the lessons 
they learned there. One can only hope.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 Anthropologists must be fully cognizant of the danger, and 
advance carefully with eyes wide open, for ethical gray areas and 
uncertain footing must be approached with real concern, care and 
accommodation, especially by those of us who are just setting 
forth on the journey for the first time. When our own storms 
come, and they will, we should not have to dive under the 
tattered Code of Ethics and get soaked through to the bone in 
the process. We have to learn how to build our own shelters—
complex, strong and supple—that will actually survive 
tumultuous times. It is our responsibility as the next generation to 
know our past, but question our inheritance.  
 A brief sketch of the ethical complexities tackled thus far 
reveals that little is certain, so uncertainty itself must become a 
point of departure for ever deeper moral inquiry: transparency in 
practice is partially opaque, our field relationships are a tangled 
web of partial fictions, universally satisfactory representation is 
often (if not always) impossible, dialectical engagement means 
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negotiating both collusion and resistance, and it remains our 
choice to do rhetorical violence to the violent.  
 While I have cited several ethnographers who have also 
puzzled and toiled through these concerns, there are many others 
who have managed to study about, work with and/or publish on 
militants, some who are sympathetic to their subjects and others 
who are not, without ever addressing ethical issues of collusion, 
research complicity, or rhetorical violence to the violent (e.g., 
Edwards 1994, Hansen 1999, Kurien 2004, Seneviratne 1999, 
Tambiah 1992 and 1996). Does an anthropologist who has done 
work with extremists have to address the question of collusion, 
rapport, or representation head on, explicitly, and in gruesome 
detail? While reflexivity of this kind does not need to be poured 
onto into every book and article (though as a reader I personally 
appreciate when it is), I do hope that behind the scenes these 
ethical dilemmas are being worked through, discussed and taken 
seriously from start to finish. 
 On a personal note of conclusion, the complexities, fictions 
and ethical intractability that I have discussed at length in regards 
to my Hindutva and Khalistani interlocutors, is by no means only 
a symptom of extreme fieldwork situation with those informants 
who spout vitrol and carry (and throw!) lathis. In a fruitless effort 
to side-step the double duplicities and the ethical tribulations of 
my work with Hindu and Sikh religious nationalists, I choose my 
dissertation research project more carefully. My initial logic: I am 
a Buddhist convert myself, and since Buddhist convert 
communities tend away from religious nationalisms and the 
discourses of hate, what could be more ethically straightforward 
than research with a Dalai Lama–loving community that makes 
meditations on compassion, peace, and enlightenment their 
raison d’etre? Ah, yes. Well, lesson learned. In a nutshell, it turns 
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out that my Buddhist informant community, the Foundation for 
the Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition, wants to build a 
500–foot statue of Maitreya, the Buddha of Loving-Kindness, in 
the heart of rural India; however, the two thousand plus 
subsistence farming families who own the 750–acre tract of land 
that the state government plans on taking by force to give to my 
Buddhist informants for their giant statue are understandably 
quite angry. Enter (from stage left)…me. My research turned into 
a painful exercise in failed communication and mediation, and it 
tossed me headlong into yet another series of ethical dilemmas.  
 During my dissertation fieldwork, the Code of Ethics of the 
AAA was worse than useless—again. It was like a dull noise in 
the distance that keeps one tossing and turning through the night: 
a relentless car alarm two blocks away, or a neighbor’s dog that 
will not stop barking. “Avoid harm or wrong…” Avoid harm to 
whom? Make a public fuss on behalf of the farmers, and I harm 
the reputation and agenda (the literal “heart project”) of the 
Buddhist group. Stay silent, and be complicit in the 
disenfranchisement of thousands of small farmers. Avoid? Harm? 
I will spare you the nitty-gritty details of how I proceeded, or why 
I believe I acted as ethically as possible in the situation. My point 
here is that the Code of Ethics was an unbearable distant hum, a 
pretentious easy answer where there was none, a retreat 
backwards with every flank still exposed; it was a trap. The only 
way forward involved unambiguously turning my back on it 
altogether.  Instead, it took soul-searching, eggshell–treading, 
back-breaking work, and painstaking tacks back and forth and 
back again to find ethical ground upon which to stand, albeit it 
precariously. It has always been precarious and it always will be, 
and that is what lies hidden beneath the Code’s smudge of a 
shadow.  
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 If the Code was supposed to serve as a lifeboat for those of 
us trapped in shark infested waters, then why does it keep sinking 
just when it is needed the most? Poor construction, brittle 
material, shoddy craftsmanship… The truth is that it was never 
meant to help us. The Code of Ethics is a stage piece; it is a door 
that leads to nowhere. It symbolizes and signals our vaunted 
professionalism to outsiders, but it is a white lie and we of all 
people should know better. The stand-off in Kushinagar 
continues, by the way, and so does my careful skate across ethical 
thin ice.xi
 Professional codes of ethics themselves do violence to our 
ability to contextualize and particularize our methods and moral 
grounding on a site to site basis. Marilyn Strathern writes that 
human subjects approval boards and ethical codes themselves are 
dangerously close to shaping and limiting the terms of our 
fieldwork: “However much talk there is of collaboration or 
conserving the autonomy of subjects or recognizing their input 
into the research or taking power into account, this aspect of 
ethics in advance, of anticipated negotiations, belittles the creative 
power of social relations” (Strathern 2000:295). Insofar as they 
take limitless potential methods and ethical bearings and forward 
one interpretation as gospel, there is something very extreme and 
fundamentalist about the professional codes of conduct themselves. 
Even though the AAA chooses not to discipline members for 
possible infringements of the Code of Ethics, and notes that it is 
meant to educate and promote discussion, the very existence of 
the Code in black and white, as it were, serves to simultaneously 
diminish those goals. If they are to exist at all, codes of ethics 
should be flexible, constantly in process, and evolving and 
shifting as a result of continuing debate and discussion.  
Institutionalized, “approved,” professional codes smack of a 
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certainty and closure that hampers ethical debate as opposed to 
stimulating it. 
 I have argued that the very opacity of transparency is cause 
for the eclipse and complication of the professional codes of 
ethics, but my ambivalence for the professional technology of 
codes of ethics should not be mistaken for disinterest in ethics 
themselves. I am committed to the revitalization of ethical 
engagement within anthropology, and indeed I would argue that 
this paper has been written in that spirit. I would join Pels (2000) 
and Giri (2000) in condemning the codes of conduct while 
simultaneously calling for a rejuvenation of moral inquiry. Pels 
writes that the conventional modus operandi of anthropology 
distances self from moral practice and political engagement 
except through quasi-legal ethics code. He bemoans the loss of 
the third element, that is, the moral ideal to which everyone 
should strive. On the other hand, Giri suggests that Immanuel 
Kant’s notion of autonomy and Gandhi’s notion of swaraj, or 
self-rule, may offer anthropologists more hallowed moral ground 
than our current professional code of ethics. Giri’s work evokes 
Cassell’s discussion (1980) of the problem with university human 
subject review boards, since the latter also gestures towards 
Kant’s exaltation of human autonomy as a starting point for 
anthropological ethics. Similarly, Deborah Battaglia’s “ethics of 
the open subject” foregrounds the need to engage ethics without 
essentializing or disciplining, while remaining open to the 
ambiguities and multiple valences of the subject(s) of 
anthropology (1999). Moral engagement and ethical fieldwork are 
lofty ideals worth pursuing—they represent horizons we ought to 
continue striving towards, and yet we must never delude 
ourselves into believing that we have finally arrived.    
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 Anthropologists often tread in complex cultural chasms 
thickly mined with real and phantasmic dangers: ideologies, 
research methods, representations and even the physical realities 
of a field-site can all be imbued with violence from time to time. 
As anthropologists we work to complicate and bridge the deep 
gap between self and other, so we cannot be shocked when the 
bright light of moral inquiry reveals just how far one might fall 
with a single misstep. Absolute, unquestioning reliance on the 
Code of Ethics of the AAA is akin to putting one’s faith in a 
dusty old parachute hastily packed many years ago by unknown 
hands, and then jumping headfirst into the abyss.  
 
Endnotes 
 
i. The camp was run by members of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
and the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (the diaspora version of the 
infamous Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, which was temporarily 
banned after members planned and executed Mohandas Gandhi's 
murder), which are part of the Hindutva (Hindu-ness) family. As part 
of the Hindutva movement, the VHP and HSS discourse hinges on a 
strictly Hindu nationalism that stands in opposition to “foreign” 
minority religious groups in India, notably Christians and Muslims. For 
more on Hindutva, see Kurien 2004, Hansen 1999, McKean 1996, 
Prashad 2000, and Tambiah 1996.  
2. The lathis at the camp were long skinny poles. Lathis are often a 
sign of violence and disciplining, as they are carried by police, and also 
mobs. 
3. The Pew Charitable Trust’s Religion and the New Immigrants 
Project, and the Harvard University's Pluralism Project each 
contributed funding towards a full twelve months of research.  
iv. Sikh fundamentalist ideology revolved around the maintenance 
of militant fervor in the pursuit of a Sikh homeland, Khalistan, and 
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these Sikhs defined themselves against the Hindu majority in India, 
while carefully maintaining a historical mistrust for Muslims as well. For 
more on Sikh nationalism see Juergensmeyer 2000 and Mahmood 1996. 
On the other hand, Hindu fundamentalist narratives paint the picture 
of embattled Hindus striving to protect their religious integrity from 
inherently dangerous and alien Muslim and Christian Indian minorities. 
For more on Hindu nationalism, see the first footnote. As well as 
hinging on very contested historical constructions and narratives of 
religious interpretation and practice, both extremisms advocate violent 
means if necessary to achieve states solely dominated by their own 
religion and no other.  
v. Battaglia advocates for an ethics of the open subject which is 
neither relativist nor universalist, since moral scrutiny would tack back 
and forth with accommodation to complexities of cultural and 
historical particulars (1999).  
vi. Anthropologists have long grappled with the issue of “covert 
research” for government or military establishments, but I would argue 
that that particular element of the debate is beyond the purview of this 
article. Here I am questioning the brittleness of the Code of Ethics as 
they stand based on the “covert” aspects of our normative research, 
and although I particularly look at work done with ideological 
antagonists, the question of actual spying is an ethical morass for 
another time and place. The issue of anthropology and intelligence has 
been handled admirably by others; for more see Gusterson and Price 
2005, Moos 2005, Price 2007, Turner 2008, and Wolf and Jorgensen 
1971.    
vii. My informants were well read in literatures that affirmed and 
contradicted their position, as there were pamphlets and thought pieces 
circulated amongst the Hindu fundamentalist community that directly 
replied to the arguments of scholarly and journalistic entities writing 
against Hindutva. One thought piece even cited parts of 
Fundamentalisms Observed (Marty and Appleby 1991), in which it was 
reported that Judeo-Christian fundamentalisms are more missionizing 
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than a movement like Hindu fundamentalism.  The VHP pamphlet 
used the scholarly work to eke out an argument that Hindu 
fundamentalism was “better” than Islamic and Christian 
fundamentalisms. 
viii. One of my funding agencies likewise demonstrated some 
anxiety about the antagonism of my informants. The Pluralism Project 
opted to give inquirers about my research directions on how to request 
my paper directly from me, although all other funded student research 
was published on their website. 
ix. Sikhs would invariably argue emphatically that Guru Gobind 
Singh (1666–1708) did not shed blood in defense of Hindu dharma, but 
rather in defense of Sikhi and against political repression (Singh 1999).  
In fact, few histories deny that Guru Gobind Singh fought in battles 
against Hindu rajahs, as well as with them when against Muslim rulers. 
Many Sikhs argue that Hindu fundamentalist discourse problematically 
appropriates Sikh martyrs in an effort to encompass Sikhism as part of 
Hinduism.  
x. By the time I entered the field the Khalistan movement had 
receded so far in to the political background in Punjab that the 
separatist movement in the Washington DC area was only maintaining 
itself through very heavy-handed, ahistorical discourses of Othering 
and hatred. Perhaps my timing, in addition to the fact that I did not 
explicitly do interviews with torture victims, made my experience with 
Sikh militants less complex and multivalent than Mahmood’s. I could 
find nothing tolerable about the intolerance being taught to children at 
the most religiously and politically conservative of the Sikh gurdwaras 
where I did research.  
11. The Buddhist group (the Maitreya Project of FPMT - the 
Foundation for the Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition) still won’t 
talk to the farmers, and the farmers won’t budge unless moved by the 
police or the army, but I do believe that my interventions at least 
brought the confrontation to light, and now the Buddhist 
administrators are being pressured by their donors to look for 
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compromises. If you're really curious, check out my contributions on 
the issue in the Wild River Review - www.wildriverreview.org. 
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